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I will address in this study the future of banking. This will be done against the
backdrop of revolutionary forces shaping an increasingly fast-moving
banking landscape. The first part of the study focuses on the ultra-long drivers
of banking structures and institutions. To that end, I will identify the
long-term determinants of our rapidly changing society. The second part will
outline the implications of this long-term vision for the strategic direction and
business models of banks in the near future. 
For the first time in history, a global techno-market order is transforming the
world of finance, business, and society more broadly, raising urgent questions
about the future of banking. Afast-forward modernising post-utopian society,
driven by new technology waves and changing human values and
preferences, is shaping an increasingly fast-moving banking landscape. Also
the nature of financial products is changing, with the demand for products and
services that address in integrated ways the life-cycle planning and risk
control needs of households and enterprises, increasing rapidly. Bankers of
the future will operate increasingly as life-cycle engineers, whereby the larger
part of their income is expected to come from offering an integrated approach
to advice and asset-and liability management. 
The architecture (institutional structure) of banks is changing rapidly in
response to a transformation of the underlying structure of technologies (and
associated impact on transaction and economic capital costs). Technology is
also key for risk management and producing new products and services that
address in effective ways the aforementioned life-cycle planning and risk
control needs of household and firms. This new banking architecture is to be
guided by a revised business model that welds together information and
transaction capabilities so as to create exceptional value. 
Change and adaptation is taking place within each type of banking system
(relationship-based and arm’s-length). The study argues that a new hybrid
type of banking system is emerging, called ar elationship-cum-market-based
banking system, in which financial engineering and the integration of
products and services from outside suppliers play a greater role than before.
It is concluded that both the financial supermarket model and the traditional
bancassurance model need to be revised. 
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 5Although the search for greater focus and specialisation has resulted in
unbundling (de-mergers) of activities, there is still an important place for
merger and acquisition activity in shaping the banking architecture of the
future, with an increasing emphasis on cross-border M&As. Cost scale
economies and risk diversification are important drivers of M&As. 
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 6TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Bankers on a roller coaster ride 9
1.1. In the 1980s the banking industry started a roller coaster ride 9
1.2. Revolutionary forces shaping a rapidly evolving banking landscape 11
1.3. Urgent questions about the future of banks 12
1.4. All the answers are different! 15
2. Banking in a fast-forward modernising post-utopian society 17
2.1. A global techno-market order is transforming our society 18
2.2. The emergence of post-utopian values and their impact on financial
markets and institutions 19
3. Bankers as life-cycle engineers 21
3.1. Increasing complexity of life-cycle planning needs 21
3.2. An increased demand for more sophisticated but simpler 
to understand financial products to control life-cycle risks 21
3.3. The challenge to deal with society’s largest life-cycle risks 22
4. New banking architectures and business models 25
4.1. Technology as key driver of changes in architecture and revisions
of business models 25
4.2. The challenge of designing and implementing competency-based
business models 26
4.3. The impact of the ongoing risk management revolution on banking 28
4.4. Why higher ethical standards are crucial 29
5. The direction of banking in the coming years 31
5.1. Convergence of banking systems? 31
5.2. The emergence of large financial groups 33
5.3. The emergence of one-stop banking and bancassurance 34
5.4. The emergence of a new type of banking system 37
5.5. The search for new business strategies in an increasingly market-
oriented banking system based on longer-term relationships 38
5.6. Critical questions about the business logic behind fully integrated
financial groups 39
5.7. Is the business case behind the traditional bancassurance model
still viable? 40
5.8. Focusing, unbundling and outsourcing in a rapidly changing
financial landscape 42
5.9. Moving from one-stop banking to focused financial groups mark II 43
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 76. The continued importance of M&As in banks’ business models 45
6.1. Consolidation and economies of scale 45
6.2. The increasing importance of cross-border mergers 47
6.3. The role of risk diversification in M&As 50
6.4. Risk diversification gains from cross-border M&As in banking
and insurance 54
7. Concluding remarks 57
8. Annexes: 59
8.1. Annex A: Statistical framework 59
8.2. Annex B: Data 61
8.3. Annex C: Covariance and correlation results 61
9. References 63
SUERF – Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières 69
SUERF STUDIES 70
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 81. Bankers on a roller coaster ride
1.1. In the 1980s the banking industry started a roller coaster ride
From World War II through the 1970s, banking was a relatively stable
business
2 with relatively few bank failures
3. But after that period, the banking
industry has been on a roller coaster ride with deregulation and liberalisation
as key drivers of stronger competition, punctuated by a strong rise in the
number of failures through the 1980s and 1990s
4. Chart 1 illustrates the US
experience 1934 – to 2003. 
Chart 1: Number of US commercial bank and savings institutions failures (1934–2003)
Over the past quarter-century a dramatic consolidation has taken place among
banks. For example, in the US there are about 7,600 commercial banks today,
down from approximately 13,000 in 1980
5. The past decades also saw
9
2 It is not suggested here that in the 1950s and 1960s no important changes in banking
strategies and business took place. For example, Walter Wriston, the former chairman of Citicorp,
is widely credited with introducing in the 1960s the negotiable certificate of deposit, the holding
company structure, and the for that time revolutionary idea that banks should focus on earning
a return on equity – see Reed (2005). However, in comparison to the 1950s and the 1960s the pace
of change in banking has accelerated tremendously during the last two decades.
3 For example, in that post-war period no more than 10 US bank failures occurred in any year,
(Wheelock (1993).
4  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), Blommestein and Lange (1993)
Blommestein, (1997). These studies provide an overview and diagnosis of banking failures or
banking crises in the US, Japan, Europe and elsewhere.
5 Olson (2005).
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beginning of the march of the information and communication technology
(ICT) revolution, and the emergence of global finance. 
This rapidly changing banking landscape prompted great interest in better
understanding the drivers, economics and dynamics of traditional banking.
For example, in the beginning 1990s, many banking industry seminars (see
Table 1a) had as titles: “Is banking in decline?” or “Banking markets in
transition”. A few years later, reflecting a banking sector under great stress,
topics at leading banking industry conferences shifted to the diagnosis of
banking crises in the US, Europe, Japan and elsewhere, and, later, to the
merits of alternative regulatory structures as well as to optimal means to
re-price the bank industry’s safety net. Especially the Annual Conference on
Bank Structure and Competition, organised by Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, has become an important internal banking forum for discussing
global trends in banking.
TABLE 1a: Topics of leading banking seminars
Source: Author







Paris, 1992 and Vienna, 1996
Topic
Banking System Risk –
Charting a New Course














on Bank Structure and
Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago
28th  Annual Conference on
Bank Structure and
Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago
Governor of the Bank
of England (International
Symposium on Banking
and Payment Services) 
30th Annual Conference
on Bank Structure and
Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago
31st Annual Conference
on Bank Structure and
Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago
OECD & Vienna Institute
for Comparative Economic
Studies
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 101.2. Revolutionary forces shaping a rapidly evolving banking
landscape
But after “Is banking in decline?”, “Understanding banking crises” and
“Rebalancing regulatory and market discipline”, the focus of bank seminars
shifted to a more positive, forward-looking perspective (Table 1b).
Accordingly, an OECD experts’ meeting in the mid-1990s focused on the
revolutionary forces shaping a rapidly evolving banking landscape, including
the prospects of traditional banking (or on-balance sheet intermediation)
6. 
The focus of these forward looking banking industry meetings changed fairly
frequently, reflecting the accelerated pace of creative destruction. Hence,
conferences emphasised the changing nature of the financial services industry
and the related increase of non-banking competition; for example, broader
and deeper financial markets have provided even moderate-sized companies
with easier access to capital markets. Credit scoring and loan securitisation
have provided households with broader access to mortgage finance and
consumer credit
7. 
TABLE 1b: Topics of leading banking seminars
Bankers on a roller coaster ride 11
6 Blommestein and Biltoft, eds., (1995)
7 Moskow (2005a).
Paris, 1994 and 1997
Chicago, 1998
Boca Raton, Florida, 1998






Payments Systems in the
Global Economy: Risks and
Opportunities.
The structure of the
international financial system
Globalisation and Financial
Crises in Emerging Markets
Global Financial Crises:
Implications for Banking and
Regulation
OECD
34th Annual Conference on
Bank Structure and
Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago
Governor of the FED




Jacques Maritain Institute 
35th Annual Conference on
Bank Structure and
Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago
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1.3. Urgent questions about the future of banks
However, at the same time, the high pace of introducing innovations
8, the
increasing complexity of risks
9, rapid changes in financial infrastructure such
12 Bankers on a roller coaster ride
President of the European
Central Bank (German
Banking Congress)
37th Annual Conference on
Bank Structure and
Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago







Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago




Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago
Governor of the Bank of
Japan (Forum on Retail
Financial Services)
E-banking
Financial safety net: costs,
benefits, & implications for
regulation
The future of financial
conglomerates





Services Strategic and Policy
Issues
The Art of the Loan in the
21st Century
Increased Global Emphasis





Madrid, October 2004  
Chicago, May 2005
Tokyo, July 2005
8 Innovations in financial-contracting technology (futures, options, swaps and other
contractual agreements) together with the widespread availability of ICT (information and
communication technologies) have played (and continue to play) a revolutionary role in financial
markets by expanding the opportunities for sharing and transferring risk, more precise
measurement of risk, lowering transaction costs, and reducing information and agency costs.
Innovative financial engineering has supported and enabled a broad unbundling of risks by
facilitating both their measurement and management. See Merton (1998).
9 The extraordinary growth in the use of derivatives and the huge proliferation of new financial
products and markets, have made possible the creation of an increasing number of layers of
financial intermediation that are required to capture the benefits of advances in finance. At the
same time, this process has created a fast moving financial landscape with much more complex
risks. See Blommestein (2005a). Arecent example is the market for CDOs where the high pace of
product development requires the rapid adaptation of pricing machines and investment strategies.→
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stronger and more complex links between banks and capital markets
10, led to
growing uncertainties about the long-term profitability of many of the
prevailing banking models and underlying strategies. For example, banks’
traditional informational advantages continue to be eroded. There are
therefore many urgent questions about the future of this core function of
banks – making credit available to households and businesses, including the
share of pure relationship lending in banks’ strategies
11. Another example of
uncertainty surrounding the design of strategies for the future concerns the
role of e-banking. Just a few years ago, bank strategies focused on the
seemingly relentless march of the e-banking revolution. Bricks and mortar
were going to be replaced by clicks of the mouse in cyberspace. The title of
a speech by a senior central banker “E-economy: will we still need banks in
the future?” was typical of that “new economy” period
12. Many analysts
argued that existing banking strategies had become obsolete. The
development of Internet banking would erode the traditional franchise of
banks, while conventional synergies between deposit taking, payment
services and lending would change or even diminish. However, the crash in
technology stocks in 2000 prompted a reality check that would change many
of these new visions of banking in the 21
st Century. For example, just a few
years ago after bank visionaries predicted the demise of branch banking,
many banks are now competing for the best location for new branches. The
real issue at stake is not the importance of on-line, Internet-based business as
such; the importance of on-line banking is likely to increase further. Instead,
the more important strategic issue for bankers is to determine core capabilities
and key customer markets. And it is this fundamental inquiry that is
modifying many of the earlier (perhaps somewhat simplistic) assessments
about the place of electronic finance in banking strategies for the future. As
will be shown in sections 4 and 5, the ongoing ICT revolution will play (and
indeed is playing) a key role in shaping the architecture of banks. 
Meanwhile, the pace of financial innovations and creative destruction in the
financial sector continued to accelerate. For example, a recent survey on
innovative ways to repackage debt and spread risk noted that product
Bankers on a roller coaster ride 13
As a result, the risks in this fast-growing, opaque market segment have become more complex.
And, “[a]s the innovation becomes wilder, it also makes more pressing the question: do investors
really understand what they arebuying?” See Tett (2005a).
10 Blommestein (2005b). 
11 Moskow (2005a)
12 See Duisenberg (2001).
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13. Technology and
consolidation are playing an important role in cutting operating costs, to
a large extent by realising scale efficiencies through the process of combining
back offices and branch networks. 
This rollercoaster picture of banking is not only mirrored in the topics
discussed at leading, international conferences (Tables 1a, b) but also in the
price of bank stocks over time in the principal banking jurisdictions. 
Chart 2: Stock markets: Total market and banking sector indices
14 Bankers on a roller coaster ride
13 See Tett (2005).
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 14During the last few years, the profitability of many banks has increased, with
some major banking jurisdictions (US, France and the UK) outperforming the
overall market index (Chart 2). But even from this profitability perspective,
volatility remains a feature of the banking landscape with a varied pattern of
winners and losers in the different jurisdictions (Chart 3). 
Chart 3: Winners and Losers: Profitability of major banks 
(2003 pre-tax P&L as % of total average assets)
1.4. All the answers are different!
Today, against the backdrop of this fast moving banking landscape, bankers
seem to have very different visions about the longer-term direction of banking
in general and long-term profitability more in particular. There seems even to
be a confusion about what is a bank
14. This situation is somewhat reminiscent
of an anecdote about Albert Einstein’s course on postgrad physics at
Princeton University. The nature of Einstein’s questions on the year-end exam
was so cerebral that they would be passed around the campus after each test.
One year after exam papers had been handed out, one of the students in the
class raised his hand and said, “Professor Einstein, I think there’s a mistake.
You’ve handed out last year’s exam questions.” Einstein paused and said,
“That’s okay. All the answers are different.”
Bankers on a roller coaster ride 15
14 Pastre, Blommestein, Jeffers and de Pontbriand, (2005), eds.
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 15In this lecture I intend to give new answers to sometimes old, though
time-tested, questions. I will also raise new questions based on my analysis of
the spectacular long-term forces shaping our rapidly changing society. In
doing so, I will first study the major implications for the structure and
institutions of banking in the long-term. Next, against the backdrop of this
longer-term vision, I will focus on the strategic direction of banking in the
near future.
16 Bankers on a roller coaster ride
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society
Our societies are changing at an unprecedented pace, driven by accelerating
technical advances. I will show in this section (1) how these revolutionary
changes are responsible for the emergence of a new, post-utopian society, and
(2) why this evolving new society has important implications for the future of
banking. 
Just a decade ago, people spoke of the end of history, meaning the ultimate
triumph of a liberal capitalist political order. Nowadays, many scoff at that
notion as too simplistic. Nonetheless, we are at both the end and beginning of
something remarkable. The pace of technological and economic changes is
accelerating and the boundaries of our existence are being shifted more
rapidly than in the past. This has led to a revolutionary transformation in our
thinking and outlook on social and political reform and the underlying
utopian ideologies. What we are witnessing is the death of traditional, mainly
utopian, ideologies. The new techno-market order is pushing our societies
beyond communism, socialism and traditional notions about the welfare state.
Even our traditional perspective on capitalism (a doctrine fundamentally
different from utopian ideologies) has become obsolete. In the wake of the
death of the utopian certainties of the 19th and 20th centuries
(Communism’s collapse was but the latest spectacular example), and with
fading belief in the liberal welfare state, traditional views about work,
retirement, education, the Church, solidarity, and other social institutions are
changing rapidly. 
The central driver is today’s enormous acceleration in the underlying pace of
technological-, economic-, social- and political changes. In earlier work
15
I have called this phenomenon fast-forward modernisation. The end of the
belief in all sorts of utopias (and policies based on them) opens the way for
a revolutionary new society based on post-utopian values.
Of course, the worldwide crash of high-tech stocks in 2000 chilled the hype
about a “new economy” that seemed to be emerging at the “end of history.”
But falling share prices should not blind us to the fact that on top of the
17
15 Blommestein (2004a).
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technology are poised to hit: bio-technology (including new medical
technologies and genetic engineering, such as the creation of human embryos
through cloning), nanotechnology, and robotics. Each is its own industrial
revolution, and will profoundly alter our lives and ways of thinking.
2.1. A global techno-market order is transforming our society 
Indeed, the revolution is already upon us. For the first time in history, a global
techno-market order is transforming the world of finance, business, politics
and, indeed, physiology, beyond recognition. This new techno-market system
is shaped and characterised by a belief in the increasing importance of
knowledge, new ideas, innovations and new technologies, and a higher pace
of what the economist Joseph Schumpeter famously called “creative
destruction”.
As a result, traditional corporate capitalism is rapidly becoming obsolete,
being replaced by creative capitalism in which new forms of
entrepreneurship, combined with a greater willingness and capacity to adopt
innovations, are transforming the business landscape. Innovative start-up
firms are turning into huge companies faster than ever before. The spectacular
rise of Microsoft is an example. As a result, the pace of creative destruction
has increased dramatically. But these infant giants are quickly threatened with
eclipse by even newer enterprises. A very recent example is the striking
growth of Google. As a result of this structural change, the pace of creative
destruction has increased
16. 
This techno-market system provides unprecedented financial incentives to
scientists and entrepreneurs to aggressively develop new technologies and
thus become wealthy. But the revolution is not only for the elite; it also offers
a realistic (non-utopian) promise of dramatically improved lives for many
people around the entire globe – not in 100 years, but in the foreseeable
future.
We are not just witnessing a simple adaptation of social structures such as
banking and ways of living to suit new technologies. The Nobel laureate
Robert Fogel argues that a new synergism between technological and
18 Banking in a fast-forward modernising post-utopian society
16 Take the example of computers. It took 15 years for other countries to compete successfully
with America’s Silicon Valley in semi-conductors, but less than five years in Internet technology.
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 18physiological improvements has produced a radically new form of human
evolution, which he calls technophysio evolution. Only this, Fogel believes,
can explain recent trends in longevity
17, body size, the durability of vital
organs, and chronic diseases. Clearly, technophysio evolution has a major
impact on people’s behaviour but also on the functioning of life-cycle
institutions such as pension schemes, education, health care and corporations. 
2.2. The emergence of post-utopian values and their impact on
financial markets and institutions 
These revolutionary changes are also triggering changes in human
consciousness. The result is a litany of “post-utopian” values that include
a stronger emphasis on individual freedom and personal responsibility. The
post-utopian society attaches great importance to new ideas & knowledge,
creativity & entrepreneurship, and therefore a greater willingness than before
to adopt innovations & new technologies. Post-utopian values touch all
dimensions of our life, including political activism based on life-style
considerations instead of traditional ideologies and religions; a preference for
frequent job and career changes; more flexible retirement arrangements;
weaker civic engagements; and a search for a new morality
18 & new
expressions of religion. A key manifestation of this shift to post-utopian
values is the growing trend of individualism, and the related need to take
more responsibility for key life-cycle decisions (education, work, savings,
health insurance, retirement, and so on). 
This shift to the post-utopian society and associated values will accelerate
over time. Increasingly, therefore, markets and institutions (including banks)
will be transformed by the drivers of this shift. For example, emerging
technologies such as omnipresent computing, human-to-machine
communications, sensor networks, automated screening and semantic
networks (and their impact on transaction costs) are pushing banks and other
companies to move transactions that were previously internal to the firm to
the outside. Increasingly, banks outsource and offshore activities. Moreover,
and quite crucially for determining the future banking landscape in the longer
Banking in a fast-forward modernising post-utopian society 19
17 Increased longevity is of course seen as a positive accomplishment of the human race but at
the same time we are faced with an increase in longevity risk that creates important challenges for
company pension plans, insurance companies, and governments – see Blommestein (2005c).
18 The responses to the recent scandals surrounding ‘doing business the dot-com way’ and
ENRON’s ‘kill and eat culture’are important recent examples of (the need of) this search for new
ethical standards in the fast-moving new techno-market order. See Blommestein (2004b). 
2_2006.qxd  30/7/06  10:34  Stránka 19term, markets and companies will increasingly reflect post-utopian values and
related preferences, while, vice versa, they co-determine how these values
will manifest themselves. Table 2 summarises the key features of this
technology- and value-driven revolutionary transformation. 
TABLE 2: Adaptation by markets and banks to the post-utopian 
techno-market order
Source: Hans J. Blommestein, The Emerging Post-Utopian Society, forthcoming. 
20 Banking in a fast-forward modernising post-utopian society
UTOPIAN SOCIETY          POST -UTOPIAN SOCIETY
Traditional Capitalism    Creative Capitalism
National Markets         Global and Regional Markets
Labour- or Capital-Intensive Economies (Industrial or Rural 
Economy)
Technology-and Human Capital- Intensive Economies 
(Knowledge Economy)
Slow Pace of Modernisation and Development of Poor 
Countries
Based on Utopian Engineering
Fast-Forward Modernisation and Development of Poor 
Countries
Based on Post-Utopian Programmes
Intellectual Property is not an Important Source of Value Intellectual Property is a 
Key Source of Value
Ideas and ìInformationî Goods  play a Subordinate Role Ideas and ìInformationî Goods  play a Dominant Role
Economies Dominated by the Firm (Coasean Economy) Economies Dominated by the Market (Marshall Economy)
Network Effects Are Relatively Weak in Business Sectors Network Effects Dominate Business Sectors and the 
Economy as a Whole
UTOPIAN SOCIETY             POST -UTOPIAN SOCIETY
National Financial Markets      Global Finance
ICT play a Small Role in Banking Strategies and 
Architecture
ICT play a Central Role in Banking Strategies and 
Architecture
Banks Operate as Rigid Pyramids with Middle Managers as 
Intermediaries for Information Up and for Decisions Down 
Banks Operate as Networks to Co-ordinate & Integrate 
Business Elements Offered Externally by the Market 
Banks and their Clients are Facing Fairly Simple Risks in a 
Slowly Moving Financial Landscape 
Banks and their Clients are Facing Increasingly Complex 
Risks in an a Fast Moving Financial Landscape 
Banks Use Very Rudimentary Risk Management 
Technologies & Products 
Banks Use Sophisticated Risk Management Technologies & 
Products
ICT Plays a Subordinate Role in the Production and 
Distribution of Services 
ICT Plays a Dominant Role in the Production and 
Distribution of Services
Pace of Financial Innovations and Creative Destruction is 
Slow 
Pace of Financial Innovations and Creative Destruction is 
High
Segmented Banking Sector with Supply of Highly 
Standardised, Relatively Simple Products
Integrated Banking Sector with Supply of Complex 
Customised Life-Cycle Products
Prudential Regulations Based on Simple Financial Ratios 
Defined by Supervisors (Top-Down Approach)
Prudential Regulations Based on Best Practices of the Most 
Sophisticated Banks (Bottom-Up Approach)
Bankers Follow an Ethically Neutral Approach to Business  Bankers Are Adopting Ethically Non-Neutral Principles  
Banking Markets & Products 
Markets & Economy
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3.1. Increasing complexity of life-cycle planning needs
This emerging post-utopian society creates new challenges and opportunities
for bankers that need to be incorporated in the design of strategies for the
future. For example, the growing trend of individualism has increased the
demand for customised products. Households are taking on (or are forced to
take on) more financial responsibility for key life-cycle decisions such as
pension plans, education, and health insurance. But, unfortunately, many
households, companies and other investors are poorly equipped to assess
properly their risk profiles and to use available, increasingly sophisticated,
risk management tools. An important obstacle is the increasing complexity
associated with products and markets in the new financial landscape
19. There
have been numerous instances of households buying the “wrong” longer-term
savings products for retirement, education and healthcare purposes, while
companies (including insurance companies and pension funds) made costly
mistakes in acquiring complex financial instruments for managing their risk
profiles and boosting investment income. 
In the future, the risk transfer to households is expected to continue, while
also companies will need to operate in a fast moving decision environment
that is likely to get more complex. 
3.2. An increased demand for more sophisticated but simpler to
understand financial products to control life-cycle risks
In response, the demand for products and services that address in effective
ways their life-cycle planning and risk control needs, is increasing rapidly. On
top of this, and this point is crucial for projecting future trends, all categories
of users (households, companies, governments, and professional investors)
are requiring that these sophisticated life-cycle financial tools are both simple
to understand and to employ. 
21
19 Blommestein (2005f). 
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financial firms would start to produce on a large scale so-called integrated
life-cycle financial instruments. This is, however, not yet the case. Although
some available products are currently being marketed as so-called “life-cycle
products”, they are too simple because they are not able to address life-cycle
planning objectives and risk control needs in an integrated fashion. These
instruments are at best capable of addressing a single life-cycle objective in
isolation from other life-cycle planning objectives, while most users have
difficulties assessing the impact on their risk profiles. 
In contrast, the life-cycle financial products we have in mind are far more
complex in structure than the services and products sold currently in the
market, while, at the same time, they are more user-friendly as they allow
a relatively simple to understand assessment of planning and risk control
needs. A distinctive feature of this innovative type of integrated products is
that they are based on an assessment of (expected) life style needs and desired
risk profile of individuals and businesses over their respective life cycles
20. 
It seems therefore likely that bankers of the future will operate as life-cycle
engineers. They will generate the larger part of their income from offering an
integrated approach to advice and asset- and liability management based on
the implementation of the life-cycle financial planning decisions of
individuals, enterprises and government agencies
21. 
3.3. The challenge to deal with society’s largest life-cycle risks
Although these life-cycle products are conceptually within reach, there is still
a long way to go. Consider, for example, society’s largest economic risks –
such as the risk associated with occupation, demography, and geography. In
this context, Robert Shiller has noted that existing risk control arrangements
are unable to protect the larger part of peoples’ wealth. He estimates that
22 Bankers as life-cycle engineers
20 These innovative customised financial instruments need to be engineered so as to permit the
optimal allocation of savings and risks over the expected life cycle of individuals and the business
horizon of enterprises. Merton (1999) has outlined this approach in his “Finance Theory and the
Shift to Integration”. In this article he describes a future trend with more integrated, tailored
financial instruments that permit more effective risk selection and control.
21 A new Wall Street banking firm – Integrated Finance Ltd (IFL) – seems to go in this
direction by offering an integrated approach to advice and asset-management that is client-focused
and not product driven. IFL founders claim that they follow a “holistic” approach based on
sophisticated, though market proven, financial theories. (Tett (2005b)).
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occupational-, and geographic uncertainty
22, while these types of risks cannot
be managed effectively with existing financial products and markets. 
In sum, a major expansion of innovative institutional arrangements and
products is needed for addressing in an effective fashion the life-cycle
planning and risk management needs of individuals and companies. This
expansion would need to go hand-in-hand with the development of
underlying markets for the transfer and re-allocation of the whole range of
life-cycle- and other major risks faced by individuals and companies
23. These
developments would give a strong push to the ongoing process of
securitisation, leading to a further steady increase in securities-related
activities in finance, insurance, risk management, the pension industry,
education, health, etc. 
The rapid development of securities-related activity is therefore likely to
continue in the 21
st Century, in large part due to the continued strong demand
of investors, households and enterprises for an expanded range of life-cycle
products with highly differentiated (customised) risk-return characteristics.
The shift to customised life-cycle products would also contribute to the
ongoing blurring of the distinction between wholesale and retail financial
markets, while also the links between banks and capital markets would further
strengthen.
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23 Merton (2003) has noted in this context that households and individuals need integrated
financial products to implement life-cycle plans. This in turn requires that banks that supply these
products need to consider a wider set of asset classes and risk than is now the case. “To the
traditional analysis of risk-return trade-offs for tangible wealth … …we need to add explicit
analyses of human capital, hedging of reinvestment rates, mortality and traditional insurance risk,
and income and estate taxes.” [Merton (2003, p. 22)].
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The architecture of banks is changing rapidly. Banks operate increasingly as
networks to co-ordinate and integrate business elements (services and
products) offered externally by the market (Table 2). Many banks have taken
the strategic decision to outsource and offshore production and distribution
activities. Some banks also (plan to) outsource such services as company
research, marketing and even product design. Banks are facing a new
challenge by having to become profitable co-ordinators and integrators. They
need to integrate the products and services offered at very low prices by
a myriad of highly specialised suppliers. 
However, there are three critical assets that cannot be outsourced (not even
partially): 
● Client relationships; 
● A brand name; and
● Reputation.
The latter two assets underpin existing relations (with clients, rating agencies,
share-holders, bond-holders, and other market participants), while they also
act as a source of long-term relations with new customers. 
4.1. Technology as key driver of changes in architecture and
revisions of business models
The key driver of structural change is technology, leading to lower costs for
the creation, processing, and co-ordination of information
24 as well a greater
availability of sophisticated risk management tools (see below).
Consequently, the architecture (institutional structure) of companies will
change when there is a transformation of the underlying structure of
technologies (and associated impact on transaction and economic capital
costs)
25. Since technology is changing more rapidly than in the past, also the
pace of institutional change (architectural transformation) in banking and
25
24 Blommestein (2006b – forthcoming).
25 Noam (2005).
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structures of business models need to be reviewed and, when needed, revised.
More specifically, the business models of banks will need to incorporate
a higher degree of adaptability, both in response to less loyal, more
demanding and financially sophisticated users
26 as well as fiercer competition
from non-banks that are entering mainstream banking markets. Technology is
a two-edged sword in this context. On the one hand, technology allows
non-banks (such as insurance companies and finance firms) to penetrate more
easily mainstream banking markets
27. On the other hand, technology is crucial
to both banks’ ability to adapt their architecture and associated business
model as well as to implement the underlying strategy. Technological
advances permit banks to respond to a more competitive environment by
making better credit decisions (also concerning categories of clients whose
risk profiles were until recently difficult to assess), by using modern risk
management systems, and in creating and using new instruments
28. Only
technology enables banks to move away from traditional models (based on
selling their own mainstream banking products) towards a broker-like
approach, whereby banks co-ordinate and integrate a range of products and
services from outside suppliers provided at low(er) cost
29. 
4.2. The challenge of designing and implementing
competency-based business models
In this way, bankers can avoid getting stuck in a “commoditised hell”
30 with
low margins. In the emerging new financial landscape, manufacturing and
distribution activities are becoming standardised, while a high degree of
flexibility, very high cost efficiency, and superior quality are taken for
granted
31. The key challenge for bankers is how to mobilise in an efficient
fashion new technologies in order to develop and sell tailored, high-margin
26 New banking architectures and business models
26 See for details section 3, “Bankers as life-cycle engineers”.
27 For example, non-bank competitors can offer higher rates on quasi-bank deposits or cheaper
loans than banks by using the latest online technologies. See Economist Intelligence Unit, (2005). 
28 Greenspan (2004).
29 For example, some German bankers are working on cutting the processing costs for smaller
credits by creating a Kreditfabrik (loan factory) for processing standardised smaller loans cheaply
on behalf of participating banks. Banks will continue to deal with customers, while the
Kreditfabrik would execute back-office work (The Economist (2005b)).
30 Skypala (2005).
31 O’Leary (2000).
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technology that is the key to both increased productivity and higher
profitability in banking
32. Bankers need therefore to become both competitive
life-cycle engineers as well as “masters of the information and knowledge
universe”. To that end, they are required to possess the capacity to select the
best suppliers, to interact on a real-time basis with capital markets, to stay
abreast about technological developments, and to have efficient access to
information about borrowers from third-party databases. 
These reformulated functions of being a banker in the future
33 will require
new business architectures. This new architecture is to be guided by a revised
business model that welds together information and transaction capabilities so
as to create exceptional value. This competency-based (as opposed to industry
and product-driven) business model for successful banking in the future has
the following 10 key features (Table 3). 
Table 3: Ten principal features of competency-based business models in banking
1. High flexibility for adapting rapidly to new technologies and other new circumstances in
a fast moving environment. 
2. Superior ability to implement and exploit fully new technologies (in particular ICT). 
3. Life-cycle approach driven by the needs of wholesale and retail clients. 
4. Focus on tailored services and life-cycle products with high-value margins, with
a strong emphasis on relationship banking with capital market scope.
5. Network architecture for the co-ordination and integration of externally supplied
products and services. 
6. The use of group-wide risk management procedures.
7. Integrated financial management, including the integrated use of economic capital
models across all business lines (portfolio approach) for maximising organic earnings-
growth. 
8. A strict performance management process whereby non-profitable activities are killed
off as soon as possible and capital rapidly redeployed. 
9. The use of a sophisticated performance measurement system that is able to determine
how much risk-adjusted money each activity is making for shareholders. 
10. Adherence to sensible corporate governance systems supported by high ethical standards
to enhance brand name and reputation.
Source: Hans J. Blommestein (2006a), the Emerging Post-Utopian Society, forthcoming.
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32 Greenspan (2004) has noted that “[t]he increase in banks’ fee income is not unrelated to
improvements in technology.”
33 This analytical framework is a variant on the institutions follow functions model proposed
by Merton and Bodie (1995). The basic idea of this functional framework is that functions are
more stable over time than institutions, while they also are (more) constant across borders and
jurisdictions. In this view, institutional structure and organisational forms are an endogenous
response to minimise transaction costs (Merton and Bodie (2005)). 
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Business model characteristics 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are directly related to the
ongoing risk management revolution. As a result of this revolution, the
business of banking is being transformed beyond recognition. As noted, risk
management is a key driver of the evolving architecture, strategy and business
models of banks. Banks have started to use more formal and rigorous
risk-management techniques and procedures, allowing a more formalised and
comprehensive approach to manage credit-, market- and operational risk.
Indeed, recent studies confirm that an increasing number of banks are now
managing their risks more effectively by the adoption of more rigorous
risk-based pricing practices in several banking markets
35. Supervisors have
noted that in recent years the increased use of these more-formal credit
risk-management procedures have enabled banks to choose their risk profiles
rather than having it determined by external events
36. Banks are now better
able to determine appropriate risk-reward ratios. Loan pricing is now more
tightly linked to formal assessments of economic returns and the profitability
of the credit and the overall client relationships
37. Sophisticated risk
management methodologies based on the increased use of economic capital
allow banks to compete more effectively
38. In doing so, the central challenge
for banks is how to deploy capital on a risk-adjusted basis across all business
lines in order to maximise organic earnings growth. Investors are increasingly
critical of those larger financial groups that are not “best in class” in all their
individual businesses
39. 





38 For details see the so-called Barcelona Report – PricewaterhouseCoopers Risk Management
(2004) and Blommestein (2005d).
39 Investors point out that at one point large institutions such as Citigroup need to turn from
being an acquisition machine to one driven by organic growth (FT.Com (2005)). But this requires
that capital is being deployed across the organisation in such as way that organic growth is being
maximised.
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Business model characteristic 10 (Table 3) focuses on longer-term client
relations and reputation by highlighting the importance of high corporate
governance and ethical standards. Much has been published about the
importance of implementing modern corporate governance principles,
including those for banks, but less attention has been paid to the essential role
of ethics in banking. Unfortunately, ethical standards are usually treated as an
interesting thought but not taken seriously enough in practice. This is
unfortunate because effective codes of business ethics serve as pillars of more
conventional business standards including accounting standards, corporate
governance principles and other codes of conduct. Moreover, they can also
serve as the glue between these business standards. Without the glue of high
ethical standards upheld at all levels of management, compliance with
business standards could easily degenerate into empty, rule-based, legalistic
exercises (“ticking off boxes”). In contrast, banks that adhere to high ethical
standards will support in a direct and efficient way compliance with the spirit
of corporate governance standards and other business standards
40. 
Recent corporate scandals have put the spotlight on the unethical behaviour
of banks and other gatekeepers of the public trust. Banks became early on
a target of investigations concerning their role in the financing and advising
of companies that were accused of manipulating their books. The role of
bankers in IPO allocations also came under scrutiny, including criminal
investigations. The scrutiny of banks by supervisors and others is justified
because of their essential gatekeeper’s role. They are sometimes compared
with spiders in the web of listed companies, brokers, exchanges, institutional
investors and other financial market players. 
Accordingly, banks are expected to play a central and active gatekeeper’s role
to monitor the behaviour of their clients and other counter-parties
41. In fact,
there are indications that society expects that they take on increased
gatekeeper responsibilities in the new business landscape
42. Banks have
therefore come under intense pressure to abandon their traditional morally
neutral approach to business. This means that banks have to bear greater
monitoring responsibilities as part of their (expanded) gatekeeper role. This
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the vice chairman of J.P. Morgan, “Our view historically was that our clients
and their accountants were responsible for the clients’proper accounting and
disclosure of transactions.”
43
Also the greater complexities of markets and clients have made this revised
gatekeeper role more demanding. Citigroup is a prominent example of these
new challenges faced by bankers. Investors have attached a discount to
Citigroup’s shares because of worries that the bank is extraordinary prone to
regulatory problems resulting from a weak ethical corporate culture
44. In
response to the various scandals that have touched Citigroup, its new CEO
tries to impose a shared set of ethical standards on the firm’s 300,000
employees
45. 
Some observers have opined that Citigroup’s problems may (in part) be the
result of large-scale transformational mergers
46. Also the shift to financial
conglomerates has increased the risk of conflicts of interest. Although these
developments may have played a role, I believe that the observed examples
of weakening of ethical standards in business are in the first instance and
pre-dominantly related to a fundamental transformation of business attitudes.
Companies are changing the way in which they operate in increasingly fluid
market places, with new opportunities but also with new moral temptations.
In this fast-forward modernising business environment with its growing trend
of individualism in society at large, whereby traditional (moral) restraining
influences on the behaviour of people have become largely obsolete,
unethical behaviour is likely to flourish
47.
30 New banking architectures and business models
43 International Herald Tribune, 30 July 2003.
44 FT.Com (2005).
45 As part of this ethics programme, employees have even to follow mandatory classes in
ethics.
46 Euromoney, July 2005.
47 Blommestein, (2005e).
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5.1. Convergence of banking systems?
There is an increasing overlap with, and stronger inter-linkages among,
banks, capital markets, insurance companies, and other financial institutions
such as hedge funds, resulting in a steady blurring of sectoral and product
boundaries. Increased interdependence and inter-linkages have led to growing
convergence among institutions and products in the OECD area. Looking
ahead, the pace of financial sector convergence is unlikely to slowdown
48. 
Convergence is to an important degree reflected in institutional changes. For
example, the architecture of banks has begun to look more like insurance
companies or like asset-managing pension funds, while many insurance
companies resemble more than before asset-managing banks. Another
example of institutional change is that even super-markets
49and car companies
are now providing banking services. Convergence is the result of stronger
competitive forces within financial systems, leading to a more efficient
performance of the core functions
50of banks and other financial institutions. In
other words, institutional changes in banking, the insurance sector, and capital
markets mirror to an important degree the process of financial convergence,
driven by stronger competitive forces. Public policy (in particular via financial
liberalisation, deregulation and a shift to risk-based regulation and
supervision) has encouraged more intense competition, leading to more
efficiency (of one or more core financial functions) and increased convergence.
But also modern risk control plays a central role in the convergence process of
financial products, banking practices and banking institutions
51. 
31
48Blommestein and Schich (2004).
49An example is Wal-Mart, the world’s biggest retailer – The Economist (2005c).
50Six core functions of financial systems can be distinguished: to provide ways to transfer
resources; clearing and settling payments; to provide ways of managing and allocating risks; the
pooling of resources and for ways subdividing ownership in projects and enterprises; to generate
price information; to provide mechanisms for dealing with various incentive problems. See
Merton and Bodie (1995).
51Advances in financial theory in combination with the ICT wave have led to a significant
expansion in the availability and use of risk management tools. More specifically, financial
innovations and many new derivatives that have allowed risks to be measured and managed more
effectively and distributed more broadly, have given banks in all jurisdictions access to superior
ways of pricing and risk-budgeting in Geithner (2005). See also the discussion above on the
impact of the risk management revolution. 
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in the various jurisdictions? For quite some time (the 1980s and the earlier
part of the 1990s), the structure of traditional universal banking structures in
Europe and Japan remained essentially intact. Later, in the 1990s, the globally
operating universal banks from Europe started to adopt increasingly
international business practices. In this development, European banks were
following their globally operating domestic clients but changes in
organisational and operating structures were also a competitive response for
attracting new clients from other jurisdictions. Thus, in offshore centres,
banks from Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands started to offer
essentially the same products and services as U.S. banking institutions, while
some major European banking and non-banking corporations modified their
disclosure practices so as to conform to international or US accounting
standards.
Moreover, in the 1980s and 1990s, one could observe a much greater reliance
by banks from all jurisdictions on capital market activities than in the past.
These structural changes in the way banks operate are reflected in the
respective shares of bank deposits and securities. Since 1980, bank deposits
have grown more slowly than tradable securities [Chart 4]. In 1980, bank
deposits were the dominant asset category, accounting for 45% of the global
financial stock; to-day this share is around 30% of the total global stock of
around $118 trillion. It is expected that the share of bank deposits will decline
further, reaching around 28% of the global financial stock of more than $200
trillion at the end of 2010.
Chart 4: Relative global role of bank deposits and securities
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securities. Private debt securities are the biggest part of the global financial
stock. In the period 1993–2003 private debt was also the fastest growing
component, while total debt (private plus public) accounted for nearly half of
the overall growth in financial assets in that period. At the same time,
international issues of private debt have grown nearly three times as fast as
domestic issues
52. The shift to tradable instruments (including derivatives)
was therefore both a manifestation and facilitator of the international
integration of financial markets.
5.2. The emergence of large financial groups 
These trends have resulted in important changes in the traditional universal
banking structures of major banking jurisdictions. Thus, while universal
banks from bank-based systems have reduced (and are still reducing) their
equity stakes in non-financial companies,
53 thereby becoming “less
universal”,
54 banks from all major banking jurisdictions are becoming “more
universal” in the sense that they are increasingly offering the whole range of
financial services. These include insurance, loans, capital market products,
retirement products and asset management services. This marked the
emergence of very large financial groups or conglomerates. In other words,
the nature of universal banking has changed and can be expected to continue
to evolve in the future. 
The relative importance of financial groups among large financial institutions
worldwide has increased considerably between 1995 and 2000. Table 4
shows that conglomerates of financial institutions has increased both in terms
of the proportion of financial groups and of the proportion of assets held by
such groups; in 2000, 60 percent of the largest 500 financial institutions were
conglomerates, up from 42 per cent in 1995.
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52Growth rates of 20% versus 7%, respectively (McKinsey (2005)).
53The process of selling equity stakes in non-financial companies is also accelerated by Basel
II (see below).
54Some scholars, following the German model, further distinguish universal banks from other
financial institutions through their holding of important equity positions and voting power in
non-financial companies.
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(Number and Size in percentage)
*
* Based on a sample of top 500 financial institutions ranked by total assets, in billions of U.S. dollars. 
Source: De Nicolo et. al. (2003).
5.3. The emergence of one-stop banking and bancassurance
Although OECD countries continue to have quite diverse financial systems,
significant convergence has taken place during the past two decades
55. In
a number of countries the norm has become for financial institutions to form
large groups that offer the full range of financial services (i.e. banking,
securities, leasing etc.): one-stop banking. Countries that have such an
institutional structure include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Germany, France, Italy and Spain, later followed by other major banking
jurisdictions. Japan authorised banks and securities houses to expand into
each others’ primary line of business, while in the United States the removal
of Glass-Steagall in 1999 eliminated the legal separation of banking and
securities operations. Already when the latter barrier was still formally in
place, banks and securities firms were active in offering close substitutes for
each others’ products, while banks’ securities powers were extended
significantly over time. This development is reflected in the current
34 The direction of banking in the coming years
1995 2000
Asset Size (USD bn) Financial Group Asset Size (USD bn) Financial Group
Highest Lowest Average Number Assets Highest Lowest Average Number Assets
Global List
Top 500  590.29 8.80 299.55 41.8 72.1 1,281.4 11.1 646.3 59.6 80.1
Financial 
Institutions
Top 250  590.29 31.28 310.79 69.2 80.7 1,281.4 34.1 657.7 72.2 83.6
Financial 
Institutions
Top 100  590.29 90.45 340.37 85.0 86.8 1,281.4 116.5 699.0 89.0 91.7
Financial 
Institutions
Top 50  590.29 169.14 379.72 88.0 89.4 1,281.4 257.5 769.5 92.0 94.2
Financial 
Institutions
55Monnet and Quintin (2005), p.7, argue that convergence in fundamental characteristics (such
as regulatory regime) does not necessarily lead to convergence of financial systems as “history
matters”. They show within a general equilibrium framework that “[c]urrent fundamentals may
not justify entry into the financial market for lenders who have yet to pay the fixed cost, but it may
be profitable for incumbent lenders to stay put.”
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56 Chart 5 shows the
breakdown of revenues of large bank-dominated and insurance-dominated
financial groups at the end-of-2003. While “core” business activities, i.e. net
interest income, net commission income and trading profit in the case of
bank-dominated insurance groups and insurance income in the case of
insurance-dominated financial groups, continue to be the dominant source of
revenues in the case of these institutions, the share of income from “non-core”
business activities is substantial.
Chart 5: Distribution of revenues at large financial groups, as of 2003
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56This article defines a “financial group” as any corporate group that provides more than one
type of financial services (e.g. banking, insurance, securities). In practise, each of these groups
tends to have a unique organisational structure based on different combination of institutions.
Insurance companies are the dominant entities in some of them (e.g. the Allianz and Axa Groups).
Others (e.g. Nordea) are bank-dominated, while others are involved in all financial activities (e.g.,
Citigroup, ING Group, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank). See also Lumpkin (2003) and
Schich and Kikuchi (2004).
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increasingly to the non-interest income of large financial groups. Pension
reform and the growing demand for retirement products has been an
important driver of the increased emphasis on asset management products and
services. Also private banking services to high net worth individuals have
become an important source of income for many banks in the US, Europe and
Asia. Banks have also become heavily involved in hedge fund-related
activities. The hedge fund sector has grown very rapidly (Chart 6).
Chart 6: Growth in Global Hedge Funds
A significant part of banking income is being generated by acting as primary
brokers for hedge funds
57. Moreover, many banks are themselves directly
involved in hedge fund-type of activities by implementing absolute return
trading strategies. 
The increase in non-interest income is also driven by banks entering the
insurance business. Many European banks reacted to the intensified
competitive environment of the 1980s and 1990s by entering aggressively
into insurance. This resulted in a new institutional model called
bancassurance. The passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act in
November 1999 paved the way for a similar development in the USA. The
GLB Act also loosened restrictions on banks’ abilities to engage in
underwriting securities. This allows US banks to take advantage of both
diversification and economy-of-scope benefits as they expand into securities
underwriting and insurance, thereby further accelerating the process of
convergence between Europe and the USA.
36 The direction of banking in the coming years
57For the larger players, prime brokerage services generate significant revenues and high
operating margins
.
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Change and adaptation is taking place within each type of banking system
(relationship-based and arm’s-length). Deregulation, globalisation and
increased competition have led to a narrowing of differences among banking
systems. In addition, technology (including new ways for risk control) has
played a crucial role in this convergence process by making it more efficient
for banks to become larger and by allowing dispersion over larger geographical
areas. However, views differ as to: 1) which banking systems (relationship
based versus arm’s-length) tend to promote innovation, and 2) whether the
various banking systems are really converging towards a uniform model. 
Clearly, what will emerge in the end will essentially be market-determined.
Competitive forces, although tempered by political interference in many
jurisdictions but strongly supported by technology and new financial
instruments, will dictate the pace of convergence. It seems likely, however,
that based on our long-term vision of the future, financial systems from all
jurisdictions will be dominated by new and complex links between banks and
capital markets
58, with many bankers operating as life-cycle engineers. Anew
hybrid type of banking system is therefore likely to emerge, with both strong
links to capital markets and a renewed emphasis on competency-based
relationship banking. In this new type of banking system, that will be called
here ar elationship-cum-market- based banking system, financial engineering
and the integration of products and services from outside suppliers will play
an even greater role than before. 
Already now, this largely market-based process has already resulted in
a significant involvement of banks in capital market activities
59 whereby their
income is increasingly coming from non-interest income sources (Chart 7).
And, as noted, the share of non-interest income is likely to grow further as the
provision of a wide range of customised, life-cycle products becomes more
important. New and stronger links with capital markets also include the
increasing use of market data for credit evaluation and loan pricing
60, as
opposed to employing banks’ traditional internal store of relationship-based
information
61. 
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58Blommestein (2005b).
59See for details Blommestein (1999, 2005b).
60This means that a bank’s rating has become an even more yardstick of its strength than
before, as reflected in its funding costs as well as reputation more in general.
61Moskow (2005b).
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5.5. The search for new business strategies in an increasingly 
market-oriented banking system based on longer-term relationships 
There is a two-way interaction between banking structure and business
model
62. Future financial systems will be dominated by an even more
significant involvement of banks in all jurisdictions in capital market
activities, while there will be a new emphasis on sophisticated forms of
relationship-banking, driven in part by the future business models based on
the provision of integrated life-cycle products. But even in the current
banking landscape new forms of relationship-banking are emerging
63.
Moreover, greater diversity of participants in risk intermediation such as the
greater role of hedge funds and other unregulated entities are a recent
example of the increasingly stronger capital market links of banks with other
financial institutions. (Chart 6)
64. 
What are the consequences of these structural developments for existing
business models in banking? I will address this question by examining the
business logic behind fully integrated financial services groups and the
traditional bancassurance model. 
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62As noted, a new type of hybrid banking system is emerging – the relationship-cum-market-
-based (banking) system.
63A recent example is the move by Bank of America to combine its commercial banking group
(focused on middle-market firms) with its large-company investment banking business. This step is
aimed at exploiting Bof A’svast network of long-standing relationships with middle-market companies.
64Geithner (2005). 
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integrated financial groups
The business model of fully integrated financial services groups (the financial
supermarket), encompassing combinations of investment and private
banking, whole-sale loan business, asset management, cross-selling of
insurance and investment products, has played an increasingly important part
in the financial landscape. At least until fairly recently, there was a consensus
view that this type of business model would prevail. However, recent research
suggests that the benefits from combining different types of financial services
under one roof may be somewhat lower than previously thought. 
Indeed, an increasing number of analysts and investors (and bankers
themselves) have raised doubts about the viability of the business case upon
which the large multi-faceted financial group is based. For example, focusing
on the benefits for banks of expanding their business from traditional
interest-income activities into non-interest activities, Schuermann (2004) and
DeYoung and Rice (2004) highlight the limits of the benefits associated with
such strategies. 
Large financial groups such as Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, CSFB and Morgan
Stanley have been criticised about their inability to make sufficient profits on
a sustained basis. The synergies between the different companies of financial
conglomerates are much lower than anticipated or, in any case, lower than
internal hurdle rates of return. For example, the business logic behind the
1997 merger between the investment bank Morgan Stanley (a manufacturer
of services) with brokerage firm Dean Witter (a distributor) was repeatedly
questioned during the past few years, leading to the dismissal of the CEO
responsible for the merger
65. Another example of underperformance concerns
Citigroup, as measured by the trading at a discount of a benchmark portfolio
to reflect Citigroup’s range of businesses
66. 
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65Morgan Stanley Chairman and CEO Philip J. Purcell Announces Plans to Retire, Letter to
my colleagues, 13 June 2005. Various reasons are mentioned including a mismatch between the
two franchises due to the difficulties in integrating two business cultures (in Weidner (2005)),
biased research due to the tie between underwriting and research, and lack of innovation at its
Discover credit card business (in The Economist, (2005a)).
66This portfolio has been constructed as a benchmark by UBS. In mid-June 2005 the resulting
proxy was trading at approximately 12 times earnings compared with Citigroup’s 10.5 (Financial
Times (2005d)).
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model still viable? 
Recent measures by Citigroup to divest its life-insurance operations,
American Express’s decision to sell IDS, and announced strategic reviews of
insurance operations at other financial groups, are all indications that the
bancassurance model is not always functioning satisfactorily.
Analysts have identified two fundamental problems
67. First, manufacturing
and selling insurance products via U.S. financial conglomerates is not very
successful because of consumer attitudes (“cultural reasons”). U.S. customers
prefer to go to brokers so that they can choose from a range of products by
competing insurers
68 (in a similar way as selling mutual fund products
manufactured by competing asset managers). In contrast, the traditional
bancassurance model works better in Europe because European clients are
more comfortable with buying a broad range of financial products such as
insurance and investment products from the same manufacturing banks.
Moreover, European conglomerates usually follow an integrated approach in
selling these products. The recent actions of Fortis are a case in point. Fortis
divested its U.S. insurance operations (Assurant
69) and reinvested part of the
proceeds in Fortis Millennium BCP, which sells financial products through
the BCP banking network
70. Also the fact that Citigroup is holding on to
Primerica Life Insurance and Banamex Insurance Company points to the
viability of the banc assurance model based on an integrated approach to
selling the products of the financial group
71.
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67Standard & Poor’s (2004), European Bancassurance: Is There Still Life in the Model?
RatingsDirect, 12 February; Standard & Poor’s (2005), Is Bancassurance Working For U.S.
Banks? RatingsDirect, 9 February.
68BB&T, Wells Fargo and Wachovia have built up very large insurance brokerage businesses. 
69Assurant was profitable but had no connections to the other operations of the Fortis group. 
70There has also been reports that Dutch financial conglomerate ING is considering to sell its
US insurance operations because of lack of success at cross-selling insurance through its banking
network and, vice versa, selling banking products through its insurance network. It is estimated
that less than 30% of its insurance policies are sold through its banking outlets (Lancher (2005)).
71Both Primerica and Banamex are integrated into the group, with sales forces that also sell
other group products.
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have to be revised
72. The competency-based business model template from
Table 3 indicates that customers can be expected to demand increasingly
tailored, life-cycle products. This may require either a highly sophisticated
manufacturing capability (to put together these tailored products) and/or an
open architecture model
73 whereby banks, insurers and financial groups can
sell the products manufactured by other (specialised) institutions
74. 
A second problem identified with the operation of banc assurance models is
the low level of profitability. This follows directly from another feature of the
competency-based banking model from Table 3 that requires banc assurance
groups to use a strict performance framework for assessing the profitability of
manufacturing insurance products. For example, in the US most insurers do
not achieve earnings on capital above the 12% level, while US banks record
ROEs of more than 20%. As a result, manufacturing insurance products lower
therefore the ROEs of bancassurance groups. This disparity in ROEs is much
less among European banks
75. 
In sum, the central challenge for banc assurance groups in both jurisdictions
is how to deploy their capital on a risk-adjusted basis in order to maximise
their organic earnings growth. And, as outlined above, this approach may
require a major revision of business models in both the US and Europe.  
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72A case in point is Dutch financial conglomerate ING, Europe’s biggest combined banking
and insurance operation. ING announced last year that it was splitting its banking and insurance
operations. The revised business model recognises that insurance and banking are two different
businesses with different tools for driving profit, even when there are synergies between them.
This model focuses on being excellent in the individual business lines, although there continue to
be possibilities for cross-selling (Lancher (2005)).
73 The open architecture model is an example of a network structure that facilitates the
co-ordination and integration of externally supplied products and services (See Table 3). 
74It has also been noted that the integrated approach can in practice lead to a closed system
with the captive manufacturing and distribution of financial products by financial groups. This
situation runs counter to the trends identified in section 4 of more focus and selectivity (via
separating functions) as well as increasing competition. The lack of competition associated with
closed systems may prompt regulators to step in. For example, the Israeli authorities recently
imposed an open architecture model for mutual fund products by ordering the separation of
banking groups that manufacture mutual fund products from the banks that sell them (Bender
(2005)).
75Standard & Poor’s (2005).
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financial landscape 
These critical questions have made a fundamental review of the prevailing
major banking strategies
76 very urgent. More in general, as noted in section 4,
existing business models are under pressure from new competitive forces, in
particular the penetration of main banking markets by non-banks.
Disintermediation by non-banks poses a threat along a wide front, including in
such areas as brokerage services, loans and payment services
77. Other important
developments of a somewhat longer-term nature are related to the expectation
that the demand for financial services will continue to grow at arapid pace. Our
earlier discussion of bankers as life-cycle engineers and the features of the
emerging post-utopian society explain why an important part of this increase in
demand is structural in nature, consisting of tailored, life-cycle products. 
As outlined in section 4, bankers are responding with various new business
strategies to deal with these new challenges. Unbundling (de-merging),
outsourcing, joint ventures and partnerships to run non-core businesses are
part of a new trend towards more focus and higher selectivity. For example,
Citigroup sold in 2004 its Traveler’s insurance unit (which became part of
Citigroup in 1998); this year Citi made another step in moving away from its
financial supermarket model by a plan to swap its asset management business
for a new brokerage business. There have even been suggestions to break
Citigroup into different companies, arguing that these smaller companies
would be easier to manage and worth more separately than as part of Citi
78.
Credit Suisse sold parts of its insurance operations in 2003. American Express
is intending to spin off its financial-advisory service, while Morgan Stanley
decided to sell its Discover credit unit
79. 
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76Bank assurance, one-stop banking, product-led retail banking and global whole-sale
banking
.
77Money broker Icap announced in April of this year plans to launch a new business division
that will bypass banks. Also hedge funds have started to compete with banks that provide prime
brokerage services. Some larger hedge funds are internalising many of the brokerage services
formerly purchased from banks. Hedge funds increasingly are running their own repo desk,
securities-lending operations and conducting their own research. A few large hedge funds bypass
brokers and trade directly with other investors. Another example is the competitive pressure of the
eBay/PayPal model on the payment services of banks. Banks will need to fight back. For example,
by making cross-border transactions cheaper, reducing IT and operations costs of securities and
payments transactions, and enforcing payments standards on customers (Maguire (2005)).
78Elstein (2005). In a similar vein, Ford and Cox (2005) have argued that a break-up of Citi
would result in a market valuation 20% higher than the current market price.
79After the dismissal of CEO Philip Purcell, analysts have argued that the rest of Morgan
Stanley should be broken up as the parts are worth more than the whole (Clelland (2005)).
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mark II 
Against this backdrop, it seems increasingly clear that the trend towards
one-stop banking, and the related adoption of the fully integrated
conglomeration model, will need to be discontinued. The trend to large
financial groups mark I, that offer the full range of products, is likely to be
replaced by the formation of highly adaptable but more focused financial
groups that offer amore limited range of core services, while non-core business
is being outsourced, run or pooled via joint ventures and partnerships. These
financial groups mark II constitute an important example of the earlier
identified relationship-cum-market-based banking system. They are not
necessarily smaller in balance sheet terms than the mark I groups, especially
for the globally operating firms for which size is still an indispensable strategic
feature (see also the discussion below on M&As). But mark II organisations
are more flexible that exploit better their core competencies, including
a renewed focus on relationship banking, although they could at the same time
be participants in all sorts of relatively loose forms of arrangements; for
example whereby one financial institution distributes the other financial
institution’s products
80. Moreover, these more focused mark II organisations
are capable to use sophisticated group-wide economic capital models, whereby
capital is re-allocated across business lines whenever needed. 
More in general, future financial groups are likely to be highly
competency-based institutions that share the principal features of the new
business models summarised in Table 3. The new emphasis on sophisticated
forms of relationship banking (supported by new technologies) has put the
spotlight on new business models for retail banking that put innovative,
cost-effective branch networks centre stage
81. There is also a search for new
business models for private banking. For many banks this has become an
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80Strategic alliances allow banks and other financial firms to distribute the products of
specialist producers. For example, Barclays Bank concluded a few years ago a strategic alliance
with Legal & General to distribute the insurance firm’s savings and investment products. The
largest Dutch Bank, ABN Amro, announced that they may form a joint venture with Babcock &
Brown (Australia’s second-largest securities firm) to work on investments in infrastructure
projects (Bloomberg (2005)). Also in Japan there is a marked movement toward business alliances
between major banking institutions and non-banks (in Fukui (2005)). Another important driver of
joint venture arrangements is that they tie up much less prudential capital than entities that are part
of a financial group. For example, selling insurance products as part of a joint venture is much less
capital-intensive than selling in-house manufactured products.
81An interesting example is U.S. bank Wells Fargo that aims to offer a wide range of retail
customer services via its branches based on an integrated sales efforts model. Wells’s strategy is
to use the existing, long-term relations with its clients to sell multiple products and services,→
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to implement or have carried out major overhauls of existing asset & wealth
management activities (including hedge fund-like operations)
82. 
All these considerations indicate that focusing, unbundling
83 and outsourcing
is to an important extent the outcome of a fundamental overhaul of prevailing
banking strategies so as to achieve greater focus and selectivity. Indeed,
recent merger and acquisition activities mirror in part the move away from the
fully integrated groups mark I. As noted, there were some well-publicised
cases where banking-insurance ties were actually dissolved. The
specialisation and focusing trend resulted also in the creation of very large
monolines
84. Monolines include banks which specialise in custody and other
wholesale securities processing services
85, or in retail services
86. 
44 The direction of banking in the coming years
including insurance products via its brokerage arm. Bank of America and Wachovia pursue similar
strategies, while J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup are also serious competitors (Dash (2005)). 
Another prominent example is the Santander group where the vast majority – 82% – of its
revenues is derived from retail banking. Parthenon is the retail bank technology platform that has
the customer database at its heart. Along this database there is a product catalogue, making
cross-selling very cost-effective. All of this information is reconciled into a catalogue of all
banking operations and a continuous settlement model. Santander has used this competitive tool
also to reduce costs at new acquisitions such as UK retail bank Abbey (Horwood (2005)).
The Italian bank Capitalia provides another interesting model. Capitalia has revolutionised its
business via the adoption of a financial services supermarket store for retail customers, loosely
built on the business model of large US retailer Wal-Mart. Noteworthy is further that
Capitalia’s innovative business model emphasises better relations with customers, offers a wide
range of bank and non-bank services, and has an important place for technology, in particular
a customer relations management system that simplifies selling products and helps to identify the
needs of customers (Financial Times (2005a)). 
But Morgan Stanley’s retail troubles make clear that the implementation of a successful
business model for retail banking is fraught with many obstacles (Thomas (2005)).
82A recent example is the move by UBS to create a new hedge fund arm as well as the
consolidation of its US and global wealth management activities into a global private banking
group (Financial Times (2005b)).
83Unbundling allows banks to choose between being product manufacturers (e.g. of
mortgages, SME loans, insurance, etc.) or distributors that specialise in customer relationships (as
noted in section 4, technological developments are greatly increasing the possibilities for
unbundling). 
84Another example of achieving focus, selectivity and rationalisation is the pooling of routine
banking functions. German banks have created a loan factory for processing smaller loans on
behalf of participating banks, while 3 large banks have merged their mortgage businesses
(Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank have merged their mortgage business into
a new company called Eurohypo). Another example of pooling routine functions concerns the
processing of UK cheques via Intelligent Processing Solutions Ltd (iPSL) (iPSL was set-up by
Barclays Bank, Lloyds TSB and technology service firm Unisys). These pooling decisions amount
to a de-merger of non-core businesses. A successful pooling model would result in a significant
reduction of unit costs via economies of scale and the sharing of technology development costs.
85For example, State Street, Bank of New York, Northern Trust and Mellon Bank. Mellon
Bank is an interesting example of the transformation from a full-service bank into a highly
specialised asset and securities firm.
86For example, US credit card specialist MBNA and Bank One.
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Although the search for greater focus and specialisation has resulted in
unbundling (de-mergers) of activities, there is still an important place for
merger and acquisition activity in shaping the banking sector of the future.
Lately, many M&A activities have taken place within the same part of the
financial sector, and less across different parts, often driven by consolidation
efforts in domestic markets. However, cross-border M&As have become
more important because they seem to be essential for especially the
internationally operating banks to prosper, or even to survive, in the global
market place
87. 
Although the business model for large financial groups was critically
reviewed above, it is not suggested that size as such is the problem. On the
contrary, technology allows the creation of larger firms by improved control
by multi-bank holding companies over their bank subsidiaries and many
branches. Indeed, modern banking is about the technical ability to run huge
operations – consisting of large branch networks, a vast network of relations
with corporate and retail clients, highly complex ICT-systems, and thousands
of employees – on a profitable basis
88.
6.1. Consolidation and economies of scale 
Indeed, much of the economies of scale are the result of consolidation
supported by new (or better use of existing) technologies. This has allowed
banks to reduce significantly their operating costs. Important scale economies
were obtained by combining back offices and branch networks. In addition,
applied technologies such as ATMs, automatic deposits, online bill paying
and computerised loan approvals have allowed banks to reduce wage costs
while increasing their businesses. At the same time, banks have opened new
branches at attractive locations. As a result, consolidation and technology
have been (and still are) important drivers of improvements in profitability in
many banking jurisdictions, while it has also contributed to the breadth and
convenience of banking services. 
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87This is in particular the case for European banks (see below). 
88A recent example of reorganising a very large banking organisation so as to take better
advantage of its size, is Bank of America’s move to combine its commercial banking group with
its investment banking business. 
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have been undergoing consolidation on a massive scale, largely driven by
M&As (and to a lesser degree by banking failures)
89. As a result, the number
of banks in the six leading banking markets (US, UK, Japan, France, Italy,
Germany) nearly halved, on average, between 1990 and 2002. In that same
period the share of the 50 top banks in total banks’assets increased from 45%
to 55%, predominantly through mergers (Chart 8). 
CHART 8a: Global top 1000 banks’ assets in 1995 (source: The Banker)
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89For example, the bulk of the decline in the number of US banks in the period 1984–2003
(a total of 8122 individual banks and thrifts disappeared) was in the form of mergers and purchases
by holding companies (Jones and Critchfield (2004)). 
CHART 8b: Global top 1000 banks’ assets in 2002 (source: The Banker)
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However, the competitive pressure to continue consolidation is immense, in
particular in the strategic areas of retail & commercial banking and wealth &
asset management (private banking). Moreover, as noted above, also the
larger financial conglomerates mark I are adapting their business models so
as to achieve greater focus, selectivity and profitability. And although
important domestic consolidation has taken place, further progress is needed,
including via more strategic emphasis on cross-border M&As. In this context
some analysts have argued that in many places the gains of domestic
consolidation have by now been exhausted and that therefore we are likely to
see a growing trend towards cross-border mergers
90. 
In Europe, many banks are still not profitable enough, while they are also too
small. For example, the cost-to-income ratios of many European banks
(especially those within the euro zone) are higher than those of their US rivals,
while also their return-on-equity (ROE) is, on average, lower than those of
internationally operating US banks
91. The search for efficiency gains and
higher profitability is therefore an important driver of M&A activity in
Europe
92. Realising these gains requires that the management of the acquiring
bank is more effective at cutting costs than the target bank
93. Surveys of banks’
strategies in the euro zone show that preserving market share is of major
strategic concern, motivating both domestic and euro area-wide consolidation
94
This move to larger scale is based on the consideration that economies of
scale allow banks to realise operational and cost synergies, thereby enhancing
their franchise value. Indeed, recent banking research finds evidence of
significant cost scale economies
95, supporting the view that the incentives for
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90UBS (2005).
91Blommestein, (2004).
92Rudy Vander Vennet has analysed various aspects of M&A activity in Europe. See Vander
Vennet (1994, 1996 and 2002).
93Altunbas and Marques Ibanez (2004), concluded that, on average, bank mergers in the EU
resulted in an improved return on capital.
94ECB (2005).
95Greenspan (2004) recently observed that “[r]esearch at the Federal Reserve and elsewhere
is consistent with other indications in the past decade or so of cost scale economies, or fewer
diseconomies…”.
96See Buch and Delong (2002). However, this is not to say that scope economies are
completely absent or unimportant. Especially the larger diversified firms should have the capacity
to realise economies of scope through information technology, benefits of global brand name,
financial innovation, and risk diversification.
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96. As noted,
technology (which has lowered communication and information costs),
together with deregulation or liberalisation as permissive factors, are the
principal enabling drivers of financial conglomeration
97. The evidence for
scale economies is also supported by the process of domestic consolidation
taking place in the US as well as in individual EU countries. Indeed, the
larger, complex banking groups that are best at running their operations on
a profitable basis have good reasons for further (cross-border) expansion. For
example, recently many of the larger U.S. and European banks are rapidly
expanding their presence in emerging markets, in particular in Asia. 
In the euro area, larger banks are, on average, more cost-effective and
profitable than smaller ones
98, thereby motivating further M&A-driven
consolidation in Europe. But also many of the larger European banks need to
expand further if they are to survive the fierce global competition. Although
in terms of bank assets Europe’s larger banks are not much smaller than most
48 The continued importance of M&As in banks’ business models
97In addition, the increase in global financial services is a demand-pull driver of
conglomeration. In particular the increased demand by internationally operating corporate clients
for a wide range of financial products that should be available on a global scale, is mentioned in
this context. Bankers themselves refer also to the revenue enhancement from product
diversification, the ability to offer one-stop banking services, as well as economies of scope in the
production of bank services. However, as noted, the evidence in favour of economies of scope is
not clear-cut. It seems to be confined to smaller speciality firms in the investment industry. (De
Nicolo et al. (2003)).
98For example, in 2003, the cost-to-income ratio was 66% for large banks and 69.8% for small
banks, while the ROE was 7.93% and 5.83%, respectively. 
Chart 9: Market Capitalisation top 8 banks
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assets), market capitalisation tells a different story! In capital market terms,
many of Europe’s larger banks are relatively small in comparison to the
biggest US firms. Internationally, only HSBC (with a market capitalisation of
around US$ 177 billion) is in the top 5 of global banks (Chart 9). 
Other larger European banks are much smaller
99 (RBS US$ 100 billion;
Barclays US$ 61.5 billion; BNP Paribas US$ 47 billion; Deutsche Bank US$
34 billion and ABN AMRO US$ 37 billion). This simple overview shows that
(some of) these medium-size European banks may be potential targets for
take-overs by competitors from both Europe and the US. Even those
European banks that manage to remain independent would need to give-up
global or perhaps even pan-European ambitions, if they are not big enough to
compete effectively with their larger rivals. 
Unfortunately, significant barriers make it difficult to conclude cross-border
mergers within Europe, thereby also making it very hard to create truly
pan-European banks. Although there was in 1991 a marked increase in
M&Aactivity (coinciding with the signing of the Treaty on European Union),
the majority of deals (80%) involved domestic institutions only
100. However,
even domestic M&As as a percentage of the total has been diminishing since
1991. Cross-border, euro area M&As also fell after 1995. Subsequently,
activity picked-up with a peak in 1999, before falling below the 1995 and
1998 levels at the end of 2003 (Chart 10). 
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99All data as of June 30, 2005, except RBS (April 2005) and Barclays (May 2005).
100ECB (2005).
Chart 10: M&A between EU credit institutions
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pre-dominantly political
101. In fact, ABN Amro’s battle for control of the
Italian bank “Banca Antonveneta” is symptomatic of the inherent political
difficulties to create a truly pan-European banking market. There are both
economic and political
102 barriers but most of the deep-seated challenges to
further integration of EU banking markets are linked to political barriers. At
the moment it is quite obvious that in all EU banking jurisdictions no
significant cross-border deal can be made without the silent or explicit
approval from governments. Tom de Swaan, ABN Amro’s CFO, noted that
EU governments and supervisors have demonstrated a “very limited
preparedness to yield power”.
103 Gerrit Zalm, the Dutch Minister of Finance,
has called for changes in the EU supervisory approval process “to prevent
some [supervisors from] member states protecting their markets from foreign
entry”
104. 
The continued entry of European banks in the highly competitive US banking
market, as well as the fact that European and American banks are moving into
emerging markets, also provide support for the view that these politically
motivated barriers are relatively strong in Europe. As noted, this is a highly
undesirable situation as cross-border M&As are essential for the
internationally operating EU banks to prosper (or even survive) in the global
market place over the longer-term
105.
6.3. The role of risk diversification in M&As 
In addition to market share and economies of scale (and scope), risk
diversification is also an important driver of merger activities
106. In particular
cross-sector consolidation has been credited with the potential to diversify
income risks. Empirical studies have evaluated the risk-reduction potential of
combinations of traditional and non-traditional banking activities such as
insurance and securities activities. For example, Kwast (1989) studied the
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101Blommestein (2005f).
102This includes regulatory (and supervisory) obstacles as these are under the control of (and
the result of) the political process.
103Financial Times (2004). 
104The Banker, (2005). Some analysts have argued in favour of major changes in the
EU’s supervisory structure. For example, Eijffinger (2004) argues in favour of a European
Financial Services Authority to improve cross-border supervision.
105The Dutch Minister of Finance notes in this context that “some of the large, EU-based
groups tend to be bigger outside the EU than within it.” (Zalm (2005)).
106For example, Morgan (2000) argues that diversification across product lines and markets
was an important driver of mergers in the 1990s.
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non-trading assets and found some potential for diversification gains
107. This
conclusion was confirmed in a recent study by Geyfman (2005) by reporting
evidence of diversification gains for banks that participate in the securities
business
108. Boyd and Graham (1988) concluded that merging banks with life
insurance firms would decrease the bankruptcy risk of the merged entity.
Lown et al. (2000) show that there are clearly diversification benefits to
mergers between bank and life insurance companies
109. Another study
provides an estimate of the incremental diversification benefits between
insurance and banking activities, ranging from a 5% to 10% reduction in
capital requirements, depending on the business mix
110. Estrella (2000)
concludes that there are potential diversification gains from virtually all
combinations of banking and insurance (both life and P&C)
111. 
Also a recent ECB analysis of the correlation between returns on euro area
banking and insurance indices concludes that there may be diversification
benefits from conglomeration. Although the “raw” correlation between these
indices is very high and therefore the potential for risk diversification low, an
adjusted correlation analysis by filtering out market-wide movements,
yielded much lower correlations often near zero
112. The same ECB study
concluded that the highest returns per unit of risk over the period 1990–2004
is achieved when banking and non-life insurance are combined. 
In a recent empirical study conducted at the OECD, potential benefits of
diversification strategies from the perspective of individual banks were
examined
113. More specifically, the study focused on the risk-reduction potential
of combining (hypothetically) traditional, homogenous banking activities with
non-traditional activities such as insurance (see Annex A for details). All
calculations reported here are based on German data (see Annex B for details). 
The continued importance of M&As in banks’ business models 51
107But Kwast (1989) also concludes that securities or trading activities are associated with
higher volatility of returns, but not necessarily higher average returns. Also Stiroh (2002)
concludes that greater reliance on non-interest income, particular trading revenue, is associated
with higher risk and lower risk-adjusted profits.
108See Geyfman (2005).
109Lown et al. (2002).
110See Oliver, Wyman and Company (2001). A revision of this report was presented at the
Netherlands-United States Roundtable on Financial Conglomerates as Kuritzkes et al. (2002).
111Estrella (2000). 
112ECB (2005).
113This study is part of a larger project on risk management strategies by banks in the OECD
area. Follow-up research will focus, inter alia, on risk diversification & systemic risk; credit risk
transfer & banks; diversification across geographical lines & cross-border mergers; and the use of
financial risk models based on copulas.
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banking business with non-traditional activities such as insurance can be
deduced from the following variance-covariance matrix (Table 5). 
Table 5: Variance-covariance matrix of German financial sector returns, 
February 1990 to March 2005
Source: H. J. Blommestein and S. Schich (2005) 
Table 5 shows that from the perspective of banks, non-life insurance
activities lead to potentially larger diversification gains than those associated
with life insurance. Sectoral correlations and covariances for a longer period
and a broader set of activities give a similar picture (Annex C, Table C1).
These findings are also in accordance with a recent ECB study
114 and US
research
115. But in contrast to these recent results, earlier studies of the
risk-return characteristics of pre- and post-merger firms found that
life-insurance firms offered the best prospect as a match for banks
116. 
Correlation and covariance results using data of individual (German)
financial firms confirm that pro-forma mergers between non-life firms and
banks yield potentially larger risk diversification gains than those associated
with life insurance (Table 6)
117. 
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Non-life Reinsurance Life Banking
insurance insurance
Non-life insurance 0.9256 0.2412 0.2512 0.2071
Reinsurance 0.2412 3.8291 0.5611 1.6475
Life insurance 0.2512 0.5611 2.3603 0.5156
Banking 0.2071 1.6475 0.5156 1.9123
114ECB (2005).
115Estrella (2000).
116See Boyd and Graham (1988), Lademan (1999) and Lown et al. (2000).
117The results from Table 6 should be interpreted together with the information from Table B1
in Annex B.
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largest diversification gains for banks has been further investigated by
calculating the risk reduction potential of pro-forma weighted combinations
of financial activities (instead of using the available German data on
individual sectoral activities). Blommestein and Schich (2005) have
calculated the potential risk reduction associated with various weighted
combinations
118. They show that portfolios with higher weights for non-life
insurance activities contribute significantly to risk diversification. The
portfolio (or financial group) with the lowest overall minimum-variance has
been calculated as the solution of a constrained optimisation problem (see
Annex A). This minimum-variance portfolio has an estimated expected return
of 0.026 with standard deviation equal to 0.806. The associated weighted
combination of activities is (Chart 11): non-life activities 60.7%, banking
22%, life-insurance 16%, and re-insurance 1.4%
119. 
Chart 11: Weights of minimum-variance portfolio
6.4. Risk diversification gains from cross-border M&As in banking
and insurance
Risk diversification also plays a role in cross-border mergers. Schoenmaker
(2005) reports on research
120 concerning the potential for cross-border risk
diversification gains by banks from different EU jurisdictions (Table 7). 
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118Blommestein and Schich (2005, 2006).
119Blommestein and Schich (2006).
120Schoenmaker (2005).
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by 5% in a single day
Source: J.F. Slijkerman, Banking Across Borders: The Risk of National Champions, Mimeo,
Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam.  
Note: The table reports the probability that the stock price of bank 2 falls by 5% or more, given that
the stock price of bank 1 drops by 5% or more.
Table 7 shows the potential for risk diversification gains for banks from
cross-border mergers within the EU. The probability that the stock price of
bank 2 falls by 5% or more, given that the stock price of bank 1 drops by 5%
or more, is on average 24% within countries. There is a clear potential for risk
diversification gains for banks from different EU countries because this
average drops to 17% for banks from different EU countries. 
Against this backdrop, the results of a concrete case, the cross-border merger
between HypoVereinsbank (a German bank that has lost more money in 2004
than any other institution in the top 1000 listing of global banks) and
Unicredito (a profitable Italian bank), are quite interesting. Earlier this year,
Unicredito took over HypoVereinsbank (HVB), although bank analysts had
raised doubts about the (strategic) benefits for Unicredito’s shareholders as
the deal meant buying “a large exposure to an unprofitable German market”
and possible holes in HVB’s balance sheet
121. Table 7 confirms, at an
aggregate level, that a cross-border merger can generate (on average) risk
diversification benefits for a German bank, but not necessarily (or not at all)
for an Italian bank
122. Table 6 shows the potential for risk diversification of
a merger between Unicredito and various German banks. It can be noted that
the risk diversification gains between Unicredito and HVB do not stand out
(a merger with Deutsche Bank, Dexia or Commerzbank would yield the same
or even larger risk diversification gains). 
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121The Banker (2005).
122Table 7 demonstrates that the potential average diversification gains from cross-border
mergers of Italian banks is very low (16%→ 15%), whereas the potential reduction in risk for
German banks is significant and even higher than the reduction of the EU average (25%→ 17%).
National bank Bank from another EU 
country
English bank 15% 14%
German bank 25% 17%
French bank 44% 21%
Italian bank 16% 15%
Dutch bank 35% 19%
Spanish bank 21% 16%
Average probability 24% 17%
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that combinations of banks and insurance companies possess larger risk
diversification gains than mergers between banks. German insurance
companies would benefit more from a merger with Unicredito than German
banks, while non-life companies would benefit most.
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For the first time in history, a global techno-market order is transforming the
world of finance, business, and society more broadly, raising urgent questions
about the future of banking. Revolutionary forces shaping a fast-forward
modernising post-utopian society are also changing the nature of the growing
demand for financial products. In particular, the demand for products and
services that address in effective ways their life-cycle planning and risk
control needs is increasing rapidly. This post-utopian society creates therefore
new challenges and opportunities for bankers to operate as life-cycle
engineers, whereby a substantial part of their income is expected to come
from offering an integrated approach to advice and asset-and liability
management. 
The rapid development of securities-related activity is likely to continue, in
large part due to the continued strong demand of investors, households and
enterprises for an expanded range of life-cycle products with highly
differentiated (customised) risk-return characteristics. 
Also the architecture of banks is changing rapidly in response to the higher
pace of technological transformation. Banks operate increasingly as networks
to co-ordinate and integrate business elements (services and products) offered
externally by the market. This new architecture is to be guided by a revised
business model that welds together information and transaction capabilities so
as to create exceptional value. Ethical standards are a key feature of this
evolving new architecture of banks, while risk management technologies
have become a central driver of the evolving architecture, strategy and
business models of banks. 
Against this backdrop, the paper identifies the longer-term structural changes
in banking systems, including increased convergence, the emergence of large
financial groups, stronger and more complex links between banks and capital
markets, and new forms of relationship-banking. As a result, change and
adaptation is taking place within each type of banking system
(relationship-based and arm’s-length). The paper argues that a new hybrid
type of banking system is emerging, with both strong links to capital markets
and a renewed emphasis on competency-based relationship banking. In this
new type of banking system, called ar elationship-cum-market-based banking
57
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from outside suppliers will play an even greater role than before. 
The final part assesses prevailing and future business strategies in this new
type of banking system. It is concluded that both the financial supermarket
model and the traditional bancassurance model need to be revised. The
architecture of banks and the underlying business models need to be adjusted
so as to achieve greater focus and selectivity. To that end, new business
strategies such as unbundling (de-merging), outsourcing, joint ventures and
partnerships to run non-core businesses deserve serious consideration.
Although the search for greater focus and specialisation has resulted in
unbundling (de-mergers) of activities, there is still an important place for
merger and acquisition activity in shaping the banking architecture of the
future, with an increasing emphasis on cross-border M&As. It is concluded
that cost scale economies are more important than economies of scope. Risk
diversification is also an important driver of M&As and related changes in
banking architecture and business models.
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8.1. Annex A: Statistical framework 
The following simple statistical framework was used to analyse risk
diversification associated with the following activities: 
● Non-life insurance (N)
● Reinsurance (R)
● Life insurance (L)
● Banking (B)
The standard deviation on the (equity) returns (R) of each (merged) financial
institution or activity i, was used as measure of risk or volatility:
(1)
The potential of risk reduction is analysed here by examining pro-forma
combinations of financial activities or entities using simple statistical risk
measures. More precisely, the focus is on the question whether diversification
benefits from these hypothetical mergers significantly lower the riskiness of
the resulting financial groups. 
Diversification and marginal risk contribution of the various activities can
then be studied as follows. Total revenue of the merged entity (for example,
a financial group or conglomerate) m is: 
(2)
with Ai assets related to activity i and Ri the return on Ai. The variance of TRm
is then equal to: 
(3)
For the sake of simplicity is it assumed that the key strategic objective of the
pro-forma mergers analysed in this study is risk reduction
123. It is also
59
123Our pro-forma analysis abstracts therefore from possible (dis)economies of scale and scope
and other considerations. 
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independently distributed
124. The new financial group can then be described
as a weighted average of four different types of activity, with the standard
deviation of returns as risk measure.
The standard deviation of the return of this hypothetically constructed
financial group (F) can then be written as: 
(4)
with σ i the standard deviation of return in sector i=B,N,L,R;  σ i,j the
covariance; and wi the sector-specific weight. 
Blommestein and Schich (2005) used this simple framework to examine the
risk reduction potential of pro-forma combinations of financial activities by
calculating various weighted combinations. The final step was to calculate






124There is quite a body of research showing that equity returns are not normally distributed.
Also the data used for this study violate this statistical assumption. Since the return series of
financial assets are fat-tailed distributed, assuming a normal distribution may strongly distort the
estimates of downside risks. Accordingly, in follow-up work this assumption will be replaced by
a fat tail distribution. The results in Table 7 are already based on extreme value theory, taking into
account that returns are fat tailed. 
125Zivot (2003) and Zivot and Wang (2002).
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The following institutions are included in the indices used in the study of the
German banking market (table B1).
Table B1: Financial institutions included in the indices
Source: Datastream
8.3. Annex C: Covariance and correlation results
Table C1 confirms the results from Table 5 that from the perspective of
German banks, non-life insurance activities lead to potentially larger
diversification gains than those associated with life insurance. 
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Non-Life Insurance: Banks:
DBV-WINTERTHUR HOLDING 24% BADEN-WUERTT.BK. 1%
GERLING 24% BANKGESELLSCHAFT BERLIN 3%
KOELN.VERWALT.GESELL. 18% BAYER.HYPO-UND-VBK. (HVB) 13%
WUESTENROT & WUERTT. 34% BERLINER-HAN.HYPBK. 2%
Life insurance: COMMERZBANK 10%
ALLIANZ LEBENS. 77% DEUTSCHE BANK 34%
AXA COLONIA LED.REGD 5% DT.HYPBK.HANN.BL. 0%
BERLINER LEBEN 5% DEUTSCHE POSTBANK 6%
NUERNBERGER BET. REGD. 13% DEXIA HYPOTHEKENBANK 16%
Reinsurance: DVB BANK 0%
HANNOVER RUCK. 14% EUROHYPO 8%
KOELN.RUCK. 1% HSBC TRINKAUS & BURKHD. 2%
KOELN.RUCK.GESELL. REGD. 5% IKB DT.INDSTRBK. 2%
MUNCH.RUCK.REGD. 79% OLDENBURGER LB. 1%
WUERTT.HYPOBANK 1%
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